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Abstract
This article questions the effectiveness of the Potter box model of moral reasoning when applied to information ethical 
dilemmas. Though its importance in feeding the desirable rational debate on ethical problems, this model, and probably all 
models, fails in the most problematic cases to solve the question of which theory best fits to a particular situation. With the 
help of some examples provided in Media ethics: Cases and moral reasoning (Christians et al., 2005), we will seek to dem-
onstrate that ultimately decisions are grounded in what Paul Ricoeur calls “conviction”. No solutions to ethical dilemmas can 
be found a priori. That is the drama of action.
Keywords
Media ethics; Moral reasoning; Potter box; Drama; Communication ethics; Aristotle; Kant; Ricoeur; Conviction.
Resumen
El artículo cuestiona la efectividad del modelo de razonamiento ético de la Potter box en cuanto a su aplicación a dilemas 
de ética de la información. No obstante su importancia para fomentar el debate racional sobre ética aplicada, este modelo, 
como probablemente todos los modelos de razonamiento ético, es incapaz de determinar la teoría moral que mejor podría 
justificar el curso de acción justo en los casos más dilemáticos. A partir de varios ejemplos presentados en Media ethics: 
Cases and moral reasoning (Christians et al., 2005), mostraremos que las decisiones morales, en última instancia, radican 
en lo que Paul Ricoeur llama “convicción”. Ninguna solución para dilemas éticos puede ser encontrada a priori. Ese es el 
drama de la acción.
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1. Introduction 
While not commonly discussed among the European ethics 
and ethics of information research communities, the model 
of moral reasoning proposed by Ralph B. Potter, known as 
the Potter box1, has enjoyed strong influence in the United 
States across various fields such as journalism, public rela-
tions, advertising, and business ethics, especially since the 
publication, in 1983, of Media ethics: Cases and moral rea-
soning (Christians; Rotzoll; Fackler, 1983). The publication 
of its 10th edition in 2016 constitutes a good opportunity to 
revise the ethical model and reassess its effectiveness.
According to its authors, the Potter box can operate as a 
valuable framework for applied ethical reasoning processes 
and serves to feed the rational debate and critical analysis 
that is so often lacking when taking decisions bearing ethical 
implications. According to this model, the decision-making 
framework, when faced with moral dilemmas should be di-
vided into four major steps: 
- description of the situation;
- identification of the values held by the individuals invol-
ved;
- prescriptions of ethical principles adjusted to the situa-
tion;
- definition of loyalties and responsibilities.
The purpose of this paper is to reflect on applications of the 
Christians, Clifford G.; Fackler, Mark; Richardson, Kathy-Brittain; Kreshel, 
Peggy J.; Woods, Robert H. (2016). Media ethics: Cases and moral 
reasoning (10th ed.). New York: Routledge, 405 pp. ISBN 978 1 205 89774 
Potter box model to information problems and evaluate its 
effectiveness. With the help of case studies provided in the 
book, we seek to demonstrate that, despite its merits in 
contributing to the media ethics debate, the Potter box fails 
to solve the problem of which of the major ethical theories 
to apply in each concrete situation.
2. The Potter box model of moral reasoning
According to Christians et al., the Potter box can be unders-
tood as a technique for revealing the important steps in moral 
deliberation in order to ground and justify practical decisions. 
Correspondingly, the model is based on the assumption that 
moral judgments must be rational, i.e. based on valid argu-
ments. However, this does not mean that the model provides 
unique and unquestionable solutions to the problems pre-
sented. Its purpose is primarily to foster rational discussion 
that takes into account the identification of values, the choice 
of a theoretical framework, and the definition of responsibi-
lities of those involved. Its application to the scope of ethical 
reflection has two objectives: 
- to develop analytical skills; 
- to promote the moral conscience of subjects (Christians 
et al., 2005).
The Potter box advocates the division of ethical reflection 
into four main steps: the first two are descriptive and seek 
to generate the relevant information for subsequent discus-
sion and decision-making, and the latter two are normative 
or prescriptive. This model works as a system by which each 
of the four dimensions or steps is mutually interlinked. 
• First, a description of the specific situation under 
analysis should be carried out.
The authors call this the moment of empirical definition. 
• In the second stage, the identification of values held 
by the agents is set out. 
It should be noted that this second step should only be con-
sidered descriptive when analysis focuses on a past event, 
i.e. when our aim is the reconstruction of the motives that 
made an agent act in a certain way. If we apply the model 
to a current situation requiring a decision, the nomination 
of values deemed appropriate corresponds to a prescrip-
tive moment. Hence, a journalist may decide that in certain 
situations the privacy of individuals should be respected 
The Potter box advocates the division of 
ethical reflection into four main steps: 
two seek to generate the relevant infor-
mation, and the latter two are normati-
ve or prescriptive
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and prevail over the public’s right to information. Among 
the values identified by the authors, it is worth pointing out 
the aesthetic (harmony, order, symmetry, etc.), the logical 
(consistency, competence, etc.), the professional (proxim-
ity, innovation, impact, conflict, human interest, etc.) and 
the moral values (truth, respect for human dignity, honesty, 
etc.). The listing of these value types explains why the Pot-
ter box model may be applied not only to journalism and 
advertising, but also to public relations and entertainment. 
While it is true that distinct professional values are present 
in each of these activities, there is no doubt that nowadays 
the distinction between the fields of advertising, entertain-
ment, and information is tending to blur. This contamination 
is at the basis of a set of phenomena such as «infotainment» 
or «branded content». In the former, information is mixed 
up with entertainment to create a hybrid genre that under-
mines the credibility of information and jeopardizes its seri-
ousness. In the latter case, information is mixed into adver-
tising, thereby eradicating core journalistic values such as 
impartiality and objectivity. 
Beyond this misappropriation of professional values for 
other activities, there are distinct and legitimate values that 
can compete with each other in decision-making. The afo-
rementioned example, in the case of journalism, is paradig-
matic: in some situations, it is not easy to decide whether a 
particular piece of information meets the requirements that 
endow it with the status of public interest; the main crite-
rion enabling the imposition of the public’s right to informa-
tion and overriding respect for the privacy of those involved. 
That happens in one of the cases analyzed in the book and 
to which we shall return later.
• The third step may be considered fundamental. It 
is the critical moment at which media practitioners 
choose the principles of the ethical doctrine that 
grounds their position. 
According to the authors, “no conclusion can be morally jus-
tified without a clear demonstration that an ethical principle 
orientated the final decision” (Christians; Rotzoll; Fackler, 
2005, p. 10). It is therefore not enough, as often happens, to 
justify the action based on a set of values. We must submit 
them to critical reflection in order to determine and assess 
the end by which they are evaluated as good. 
The importance of this critical assessment of values beco-
mes more evident if we concur with the authors that “pro-
fessional values are inscribed in power” (Christians et al., 
2005, p. 10) and that many statements of good intentions 
conceal particular interests, guided by a logic totally unre-
lated to the pursuit of good information. It is, therefore, 
important to pay attention to those speeches with ethical 
implications made by decision makers to discover, in the 
rhetoric deployed, which values fundamentally underpin 
and support the decisions taken, which is often unclear. Bo-
ris Libois also reminds us of this problem in calling for an 
instrumental use of ethics. At a time of great profusion of 
moral discourses, it is important to recall that, very often, 
those speeches do not commit their orators to the achieve-
ment of the good of each activity, but have only personal, 
political, or commercial purposes (Libois, 1994, p. 7 and ff.). 
Following the division of ethical theories into five major ca-
tegories (virtue, duty, utility, rights, and love), as proposed 
by Louis Hodges, the authors suggest that the justification 
for our decisions should be based on one of the following: 
1) Aristotle’s Mean according to which “moral virtue is a 
middle state determined by practical wisdom”. 
2) Kant’s categorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law [of nature]”; 
3) the principle of utility of Stuart Mill: “Seek the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number”; 
4) John Rawls’ veil of ignorance: “Justice emerges when so-
cially negotiating without social differentiations”; 
5) the Judeo-Christian point of view of the person as an end: 
“Love your neighbor as yourself”. 
Each of these five categories raises important problems that 
a philosophical reflection on ethical issues has already ack-
nowledged. It’s not easy, even from the Aristotelian view-
point, to define practical wisdom, since complex situations 
can make the wisest man make the wrong decision; Kant’s 
categorical imperative doesn’t seem to suffice in exceptio-
nal situations when it is difficult to guarantee the universa-
lity of a maxim; even the greatest happiness, in Mill’s sense, 
can become problematic in the case of a conflict between 
contending notions of individual or social happiness; Rawls’ 
veil of ignorance can fail when individuals engaged in a ne-
gotiation are unsuccessful at reckoning the social prejudices 
that may underlie their arguments; and an ethics based on 
love sometimes demands to much from people that don’t 
love each other but are anyway obliged to conform their 
mutual behaviors with the principles of fairness and justice.
Despite the importance granted to an act of reasoning 
1. Description of the situation 4. Definition of loyalties and responsibilities
2. Identification of values 3. Choosing the principles
Figure 1. The Potter box
A journalist may decide that in certain 
situations, the privacy of individuals 
should be respected and prevail over the 
public’s right to information
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relying on ethical principles developed by one of the major 
moral concepts, the authors do not hesitate to state that 
“(...) no one theory can satisfactorily resolve all ethical ques-
tions and dilemmas in media ethics”; so it is important to 
understand which theory best fits each specific situation 
and encourage each to think for themselves with “rebellion 
or amiably, as circumstances demand it” (Christians et al., 
2005, pp. 11-12).
• Finally, we have the fourth step, which corresponds 
to the definition of loyalties and responsibilities. To 
whom should we respond and justify the decisions 
taken? 
The authors identify five categories of obligations: 
- towards our own conscience;
- towards customers and subscribers;
- towards the organization;
- towards professional colleagues;
- towards society. 
In defending social ethics, inherited from the theory of so-
cial responsibility, the authors state that obligations towards 
society assume great importance. Although this school, heir 
to the work done by the Hutchins Commission, insists on 
the idea that ethics for the media is not limited to ethics 
for journalists, and that they imply the responsibility of the 
media as organizations, which might lead to the dissolution 
of individual responsibility, the authors firmly state that “ul-
timate responsibility finally rests on individuals” (Christians 
et al., 2005, p. 25).
As is the case with the third step, the fourth may prove deci-
sive when legitimate, but differing values compete to guide 
the same outcome. Furthermore, the need to define loyal-
ties has another objective. According to the authors, the im-
portance of this final stage is also justified by the importan-
ce given to the establishment of a concrete link between the 
model and life, which requires considering the implications 
and consequences of decisions taken. 
After this brief presentation of the Potter box, it is impor-
tant to detail how the model can actually be used. Referring 
to some examples provided in the book, we hereby seek to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the model and re-
flect on some of its assumptions. 
3. The limits of the Potter box model
The first case the book examines focuses on a 
shocking crime, which occurred on 12 February 
1993, in Liverpool, where two minors of age, 
only ten years old, Robert Thompson and Jon 
Venables, abducted and violently killed James 
Bulger, only two years old (Christians; Rotzoll; 
Fackler, 2005, p. 25). According to the English 
legal system, children under ten years may be 
criminally charged but any disclosure of infor-
mation about the family or the identity of tho-
se involved is forbidden until the case is closed. 
Beyond this legal imposition, there was another 
when, in 2001, the pair was released and the 
court ruled that both their new identities along 
with any other information that might contribute towards 
their identification should not be revealed. The question 
that arises is that of two attitudes towards this injunction, 
which, from a legal point of view, concerns only the British 
media. In this context, the authors suggest we analyze two 
opposite attitudes: the attitude of a British television chan-
nel, which acts in accordance with the law of its country, 
and that of a North American newspaper, which decides to 
focus on the right of the public to information.
If we take into account professional values, we could say that 
both decisions are defensible. As a matter of fact, the televi-
sion station attitude is justified as any disclosure of informa-
tion about the case would, first, increase the pain of relati-
ves of the murdered children as well as hinder the possible 
and desirable reintegration and rehabilitation of the minors 
who had committed the crime. This is also the reason many 
codes of journalist ethics recommend not mentioning the 
names of children involved in violent crimes. But the Ameri-
can newspaper position is also defensible as far as it defends 
the public’s right to information. In this case, what would be 
affected would not be the re-running of morbid aspects to 
the tragedy, but instead the disclosure of information about 
the family situation of the children in order to help the pu-
blic better understand what happened. Furthermore, it can 
be argued that each position is justified based on ethically 
legitimate principles. The British television position would 
be justified under the principle of Christian love of fellow 
humans, trying to safeguard the Bulger’s family pain and the 
American newspaper position justified by the Kantian ethics 
requiring that truth must always be told. 
Nevertheless, it’s questionable that truth must be told in 
every circumstance, if by truth we just mean saying what 
happened exactly as it happened, when and where it hap-
pened. For instance, if in a dictatorship a political activist is 
arrested by the police and is asked where his fellow activists 
are hidden, he is not obliged to say the truth to the police. 
Here the solution to the problem is very simple and Kant 
would agree with it. A man is only juridically compelled to 
say the truth in a situation where he or his representatives 
have been able to participate in the establishment of the 
laws (Kant, 1998, p. 640), which is not the case in a dicta-
https://theukdatabase.com
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torship. A more difficult case happens when we think of a 
journalist being compelled –for instance, in a court of justi-
ce- to reveal the circumstances in which he has interviewed 
someone who is being persecuted by the police. Perhaps 
there are no absolute answers to this question. The two ex-
treme and opposite solutions to this dilemma would be:
- A journalist can never reveal his sources, or else he under-
mines by his behavior the ethical commitment he assu-
med with his source that enabled him to be a source, i.e. 
the guarantee he offered that the source would remain 
unknown.
- A journalist must always decide, by his own initiative, un-
der what circumstances the commitment he assumed can 
be broken.
The only reasonable solution, under the rule of law, seems 
to be that a journalist is only committed to reveal his sources 
under the circumstances this same law determines he must 
do so. Perhaps this solution will sometimes create conflicts 
between deontological and ethical codes and the laws of 
some countries. But there is no ethical code or any system 
of law that can provide an answer to every situation. There 
may be exceptional circumstances –that no code nor law, 
even the most perfect ones, can forsee– in which the jour-
nalist can only trust his own personal decision (of course we 
are dealing with cases in which the journalist takes seriously 
his job and the commitments he has taken with his sources, 
his readers and his fellow journalists; in cases of lack of will 
to remain faithful to them, any decision can be expected.)
Alerted by the possibility of an ins-
trumental use of ethics, we must 
inquire whether, in the above-men-
tioned case, it is not the fear of legal 
sanction imposed for breach of the 
injunction (for the British television 
station) and the desire to respond to 
the wishes and curiosity of readers 
(in the case of the American news-
paper) that actually ground the po-
sitions taken. 
As the critique to which values have 
been subject during the third step 
shows, both editorial decisions have 
the support of ethically justifiable 
principles. In this context, the model 
requires loyalties be investigated. In 
abstract terms, both positions are 
defensible with each contributing 
in their own way towards achieving 
good information. Nevertheless, we 
have just seen that this is simply not 
enough. The question that arises 
now is, to whom should journalists feel responsible? The 
authors are categorical: towards the innocent victims of this 
tragedy.
The second case selected for analysis dates back to April 11, 
2003, when Eason Jordan, a CNN chief executive, published 
in The New York Times a controversial article entitled «The 
news we kept to ourselves» (Jordan, 2003), in which it was 
stated that CNN had not published many of the atrocities 
committed by the Saddam Hussein regime to avoid its em-
ployees, officials, and information sources suffering serious 
reprisals from the Iraqi regime. In this article Eason Jordan 
tells, for example, how in the mid-90s one of his camera-
men in Iraq was kidnapped and tortured by the Iraqi secret 
police as he would not confirm that he, Eason Jordan, was 
the Baghdad CIA director: “CNN has been in Baghdad long 
enough to know that telling the world about the torture of 
one of its employees would almost certainly have got him 
killed” (Christians et al., 2005, p. 39). He also says that CNN 
could not disclose information that the eldest son of Sad-
dam, Uday, had revealed because it would endanger the life 
of an Iraqi translator who had witnessed the conversation 
between them. He ends by confessing a deep malaise for 
not having been able to denounce these and other stories 
that testify to the terror of the victims of the finally toppled 
regime.
Criticism of the controversial article by Eason Jordan ap-
peared immediately. Many peers criticized CNN’s position 
arguing that the station’s credibility had been deeply affect-
ed and that nobody could thereafter trust its reporters sent 
to other countries such as China, Cuba, Sudan, or Syria. Fur-
thermore, others argued that good information is not com-
patible with the concessions made to the Saddam Hussein 
regime and that, in the circumstances described by Eason 
Jordan, it would have been better not to report any informa-
tion rather than misleading coverage. Bob Steele, director 
Under the rule of law a journalist is only 
committed to reveal his sources under 
the circumstances this same law deter-
mines he must do so
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/11/opinion/the-news-we-kept-to-ourselves.html
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of the Poynter Institute ethics program, considers that the 
question cannot be faced so unilaterally. He says that the 
majority of the criticism did not take into consideration the 
complexity of the issue and even discouraged other mass 
media outlets from declaring the compromises that they 
had also been subject to in Iraq (Steele, 2003).
In such complex cases, which involves the commitment of 
the media to the safety of their employees on the one hand, 
and to the truth of information, on the other, the authors of 
Media ethics recommend taking into account the Aristote-
lian principle of temperance (Aristotle, 1985, p. 47), thought 
of as an individual virtue that regulates the soul’s appetites 
in accordance with «fair-measure». Although the authors’ 
position is not as categorical as in the previous case, they 
suggest that the best decision here should have been that 
of leaving Baghdad and pursuing rigorous information from 
outside (Christians et al., 2005, p. 41).
Within the context of the Potter box, moral principles and 
ethical theories (quadrant three) are expected to play a cri-
tical role in ethical decision-making processes. According 
to the authors, applying values (quadrant two) does not 
guarantee that ethical decisions are morally justified. Va-
luing, the authors state, “automatically come to expression 
in everyday circumstances” (Christians et al., 2005, p. 10). 
Without much thinking, people would decide according to 
community mores. Moreover, “values are never pure” and 
“professional values are inscribed in power” (ibidem). It 
could be argued, for instance, that, as a general rule, withhol-
ding graphic pictures of suffering and death is a moral impe-
rative, and that publishing them is only justified when there 
is an “overriding public interest” at stake and when seeing 
those pictures does change significantly people’s knowledge 
and attitudes regarding news events. But as we suggested 
before, there are good reasons to believe that abusive in-
terpretations of the concept of “public interest” have been 
used to justify withholding important visual information. 
In this regard, the coverage of the “war on terror” opera-
tion, which began in the aftermath of 9/11, offers a well-
documented case study (Butler, 2004; Bennett; Lawrence; 
Livingstone, 2007; Zelizer, 2010). In About to die: How news 
images move the public, Barbie Zelizer showed that editorial 
decisions undertaken by American news media to suppress 
pictures of dead bodies were not necessarily motivated by 
ethical concerns, but by a complex set of instrumental rea-
sons (Zelizer, 2010). Centring the analysis on three different 
events —the killing of Taliban soldiers by beating in 2001, 
the beheadings of journalists Daniel Pearl and Nick Berg 
in 2002 and 2004, and the hanging of Saddam Hussein in 
2006-, Zelizer contends that the decision to publish pictures 
of their impending deaths instead of pictures of their dead 
bodies helped American newspapers to attain three diffe-
rent strategic goals: first, to protect themselves against ac-
cusations of immorally taking advantage of people’s death; 
second, to accommodate their report to different interpre-
tations of death caused by war, maintaining a sort of equi-
distant position that intended to reinforce their authority; 
and third, because pictures of people-about-to-die depict 
unsettled events, which requires the public to be an active 
participant in order to complete the missing information, 
these pictures end up increasing people’s engagement with 
the news. 
To overcome these “sociological matters”, authors recom-
mend stepping to quadrant three where ethical delibera-
tion is due to identify “which theory is the most powerful 
under what conditions” (Christians et al., 2005, p. 11). 
Besides recognizing the difficulties involved in identifying 
which theory best matches a particular situation, authors 
underline another major issue, concerned with people’s wi-
llingness to act morally and to abide by other patterns of 
ethical reasoning. However, the Potter box model could not 
address this major difficulty. But, there is another relevant 
issue involved in the process of finding the “right theory” 
that the authors do not seem to give due importance. While 
ascribing quadrant three and quadrant four a critical role, 
the authors do not draw students and media practitioners’ 
attention to the fact that it would be impossible to comple-
tely get rid of the influence of those “sociological matters”. 
Following Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schütz, it should be 
mentioned that together with community mores, religious 
beliefs, cultural and social traditions etc., these “sociologi-
cal matters” configure our life-world – Husserl’s Lebenswelt 
(Husserl, 1956, pp. 123 and ff.) –, understood as the fun-
damental ground upon which all human activity rests on2. 
Both the process of choosing the right ethical theory and 
the definition of loyalties are constrained by a set of indivi-
dual and social shared convictions that shape our life-world. 
In this sense, bearing in mind that choosing the adequate 
moral theory and defining loyalties may also be “inscribed 
in power”, one has to ask why they are given a privileged 
critical function. For instance, how could we be sure that, in 
the case of the Liverpool murderer, appealing to Christian 
love instead of appealing to Kantian ethics was not a pre-
viously defined means to an end (protecting the suffering 
of the Bulger’s family)? And how could we be sure that the 
decision to withhold pictures of American dead soldiers in-
volved in the war on terror, although eventually supported 
by Christian love, was not actually motivated by a complex 
set of instrumental factors? (Zelizer, 2010). 
Of course it would be silly to claim that journalists, like other 
human beings in a situation requiring a moral decision, can 
at the same time act according to moral principles and re-
flect about the value of those principles guiding their action. 
Every man acts, in the first place, according to a background 
of convictions more or less established that he learned 
through education and inherited from the social and cul-
tural environment. Those inherited convictions sometimes 
play a great role when it comes to personal convictions 
about what we shall not do in any circumstance. Neverthe-
less, men are also capable of modifying their moral convic-
tions or adjusting them to provide the right answer to new 
and unexpected situations. But there are critical situations, 
where our stock of moral values seems to fail or to be inca-
Publishing graphic pictures of suffering 
and death is only justified when there is 
an “overriding public interest” at stake
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pable of helping us in giving the right answers. Those are 
the moments in which we feel that there is a responsibility 
that no one but ourselves can assume. That’s why an ethical 
decision and the action that follows it is not like any other 
event in the world, for which we can search for a natural 
cause. That’s also why a moral principle cannot be the im-
mediate cause of a behavior3: we are not in the presence of 
physical events but of social actors that are ethically com-
mitted, actors that try to understand, as rational beings, the 
situation in which they are forced to act and to grasp the 
possible consequences of their acts.
Whenever the application of rules to concrete situations 
creates conflicts, Paul Ricoeur calls for a return to ethical in-
tentionality4. According to Ricoeur, the fact that it is not pos-
sible to simultaneously serve all values leads to the «tragedy 
of the action», which demands an Aristotelian «practical 
wisdom», linked to «moral judgment according to the situ-
ation» by which «the conviction is more decisive than the 
rule itself» (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 256).
Ricoeur’s ethics of conviction can’t offer the same ultimate 
grounds for action as Kant’s moral philosophy. But, Kantian 
categorical imperative resists the proof of the facts –we 
think that’s what Kant means when he says that it is univer-
sal- only because Kant was willing to pay a high price for this 
universality: the categorical imperative had also to be ab-
stract –or formal, in Kant’s terminology- in order to keep its 
validity in any possible context and for every rational being 
(we should never forget that Kant doesn’t say “human” but 
“rational”. Even an angel would have to act according to the 
imperative if he was to act morally). We see two different 
problems here. First: anyone can easily deduce, from Kant’s 
categorical imperative, what he must do in a typical situa-
tion; but such a deduction may be much harder to make in 
other situations that are not so typical and nothing seems 
to warrant that such a deduction can be made at all in these 
cases. But the real problem seems to lie elsewhere, and we 
come to our second problem: moral knowledge, for Kant –as 
Habermas has correctly stressed (Habermas, 2014, p. 333)-, 
can never be the cause of voluntary moral actions, although 
in some cases moral knowledge can be the cause of our 
sense of guilt, because we have not done what we ought 
to have done. Kant even says that it is possible to imagine 
a situation in which every man acknowledges the validity of 
moral principles but no one acts according to them. 
Ricoeur’s moral philosophy tries to overcome these two 
problems. Against Kant, who believed that reason could be-
come practical and impose its norms to free individuals en-
gaged in moral action, Ricoeur stresses the fact that norms 
have to be mediated by an individual’s moral judgment in 
order to become effective. We believe that it is precisely this 
reference to conscience and to conviction that marks the 
limit of both the Potter box and probably of all models of 
ethical reflection.
4. Conclusion
In the first case we analyzed, the dispute revolved around 
which doctrine and moral principles best fitted the actual 
situation. The authors suggested an answer. How was it ge-
nerated? We saw how important the definition of loyalty to 
solve this conflict was. In the example stated, the correct 
decision required the victims be protected. We insist: what 
is the basis of this final decision? How was this conclusion 
achieved? Should the model not have served to justify 
another possibility? If so, as seems to be the case, we may 
have to recognize that the solution found, although consen-
sual to a greater or lesser extent, was based on individual 
and social shared convictions. 
In the second case examined, the authors suggested refe-
rring to the Aristotelian principle of temperance, but what 
does this mean? How can this be translated into practice? A 
solution was again presented: leave Baghdad to avoid put-
ting employees and sources at risk and report from outside. 
And we ask again: what was the contribution of the model 
to taking this position? Will this decision necessarily result 
from applying the model to the case? We do not believe this 
to be so.
In an era marked by a crisis in metaphysical and ontologi-
cal foundations, are we condemned to ethical relativism? 
Are all decisions equal? For those who believe they are not, 
which include the authors of this book, the only way seems 
to be the promotion of a dialogue able to establish a «cer-
tain order of priorities», which will “never refer to an irre-
futable conviction and be valid for all men and for all time” 
(Ricoeur, 1991, p. 270).
Despite the added value of this model, from which we can-
not naturally expect more than a support for the moral 
conscience, since morality is the scope of freedom, refrac-
tory to all applications of rigorous mathematical methods, 
we must recognize that it is precisely in doubtful cases when 
we must decide where to apply those principles and ethical 
theories that are best suited to specific situations, that the 
model falls silent and “points beyond him”. This is not an 
implicit criticism of the model, but instead due praise for 
its recognition of its own limits. Forcing thought to follow a 
unique model would imprison it, and in case of action, open 
the door to violence.
Ricoeur stresses the fact that norms have 
to be mediated by an individual’s moral 
judgment in order to become effective
It is precisely in doubtful cases when we 
must decide where to apply those prin-
ciples and ethical theories that are best 
suited to specific situations, and the 
Potter box model falls silent and points 
beyond him
The Potter box model of moral reasoning
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Notes
1. Potter box is the name 
given to the model of de-
cision-making proposed by 
Dr. Ralph B. Potter, profes-
sor of the Harvard Divinity 
School, in his 1956 Ph.D. 
diss. The structure of cer-
tain American Christian 
responses to the nuclear 
dilemma.
2. In Ethical theory in a glo-
bal setting Christians ad-
dresses this question when 
referring to the Habermas-
Gadamer debate (Chris-
tians, 1989). His purpose was to overcome ethical relativism 
on the basis of a universal solidarity “grounded in our being 
as humans” (Christians, 1989, p. 18).
3. External circumstances, of course, like the use of force 
or fear, can make someone act according to a moral prin-
ciple he would be ready to violate. As Aristotle remarked, 
although in another context, in these circumstances the 
moral principle seems to have the power of a physical 
law and an action looks very similar to any other worldly 
event.
4. In the original “visée éthique”. The concept “visée”, in the 
context of philosophical phenomenology points out the act 
by which conscience intents an object (intentionality). In 
this case, ethical intentionality refers to the need to solve 
the moral dilemma within the moral conscience (Ricoeur, 
1991, pp. 266 and ff.)
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